CHAPTER III
Intent
The Anti-Trust Act, being a criminal as well as remedial statute, intent is, of course, necessary. But it is also, of course, only intent as legally defined.
As Mr. Justice Holmes so felicitously puts it in Ellis vs. United States:[1] "If a man intentionally adopts certain conduct in certain circumstances known to him, and that conduct is forbidden by the law under those circumstances he intentionally breaks the law in the only sense in which the law ever considers intent."
But there is another viewpoint of importance in this connection, which, in its ultimate results, becomes vital, and that is that from which the law ascertains or presumes an intent as to results flowing from the forbidden acts. It was long since said: "Thought is not triable," but quite as long ago that "actions speak louder than words;" and it may be added that a knowledge of human nature as loudly as either.
When we pass, then, from proved acts, and an inquiry as to the ends sought through them becomes necessary, the legal method is well established, though it has a duality of expression that is sometimes confusing. It may either be said that intent is conclusively presumed under certain circumstances, or that intent is of no importance whatever. But the latter expression is sometimes misleading, as, while in some cases it may be of no importance, in others it is the vital, determinative fact!
To explain this further: An act is done from which certain results naturally, reasonably, or ordinarily may
- ↑ 206 U. S. 257 (1907).
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