For the present, but two opinions will be referred to, as it is thought they perfectly clarify the subject—Mr. Justice Peckham's, in the Anderson case,[1] and Mr. Justice White's, in the Securities case,[2] the latter because no stronger view can possibly be contended for than that of the minority, which dissented because the majority would not go even so far.
In the Anderson case, then, the doctrine is thus lucidly stated: "Where the subject-matter of the agreement does not directly relate to and act upon and embrace interstate commerce, and where the undisputed facts clearly show that the purpose of the agreement was not to regulate, obstruct, or restrain that commerce, but that it was entered into with the object of properly and fairly regulating the transaction of the business in which the parties to the agreement were engaged, such agreement will be upheld as not within the statute, where it can be seen that the character and terms of the agreement are well calculated to attain the purpose for which it was formed; and where the effect of its formation and enforcement upon interstate trade or commerce is, in any event but indirect and incidental, and not its purpose or object. As is said in Smith vs. Alabama:[3] 'There are many cases, however, where the acknowledged powers of a State may be exerted and applied in such a manner as to affect foreign or interstate commerce without being intended to operate as commercial regulations.' The same is true as to certain kinds of agreements entered into between per-
- ↑ 171 U. S. 615, 616 (1898).
- ↑ 193 U. S. 394, 395 (1904).
- ↑ 124 U. S. 473 (1888).
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