Page:Earle, Liberty to Trade as Buttressed by National Law, 1909 53.jpg

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have to be considered independently of the Sherman Act.[1] It is manifest, therefore, that where there is a right arising from the invasion of such a right, there must be a remedy, and a remedy entirely independent of the questions of policy involved in merely contractual restraints. Possibly, indeed, independent of the Sherman Act itself. If the doctrine of Ashby vs. White is applicable to the invasion of a nationally granted right, certainly so!

However this may be, a restraint of national trade, by limiting the freedom of choice as to engaging in it, must be an illegal restraint under the Sherman Act, if the restraint be involuntarily suffered.

And so it has always been held!

The subject is so completely covered by Chief Justice Fuller in Loewe vs. Lawlor,[2] that other cases need not be referred to:

"The act prohibits any combination whatever to secure action which essentially obstructs the free flow of commerce between the States, or restricts in that regard the liberty of a trader to engage in business. The combination charged falls within the class of restraints of trade aimed at, compelling third parties and strangers involuntarily not to engage in the course of trade except on conditions that the combination imposes; and there is no doubt that (to quote the well known work of Chief Justice Erle on Trades Unions) 'at common law every person has individually, and the public also has collectively, a right to require that the course


  1. See In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564 (1895).
  2. 208 U. S. 274 (1908).

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