of trade should be kept free from unreasonable obstruction.'"
So it may be taken for granted that any one damaged by a conspiracy against the liberty of a citizen or corporation to engage in national trade, must be entitled to an action for that damage. And that it is in its nature simply a case of molestation at common law, involved with none of the intricacies of the subject which is being generally considered.
An important consideration in this connection is that this liberty to engage in national trade is one—perhaps the only form of liberty per se belonging to corporations, and which the States themselves cannot invade. "The power to regulate that" (interstate commerce) * * * "is the power * * * to determine when it shall be free. * * * Nor does it make any difference whether such commerce is carried on by individuals or corporations."[1] As was said in Paul vs. Virginia:[2] "At the time of the formation of the Constitution, a large part of the commerce of the world was carried on by corporations. * * * The grant of power is general in its terms, making no reference to the agencies by which commerce may be carried on. It includes commerce by whomsoever conducted, whether by individuals or corporations."[3]
- ↑ Welton vs. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275 (1875); Mobile vs. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691 (1880).
- ↑ 8 Wallace 168 (1868-9).
- ↑ Mr. Justice Field, 114 U. S., p. 203 (1885). And see Vance vs. Vandercook, 170 U. S. 433 (1898).
54
