freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself."[1]
In Aikens vs. Wisconsin,[2] Mr. Justice Holmes says: "It is obvious that justifications may vary in extent according to the principle of policy upon which they are founded, as that while some, for instance, at common law, those affecting the use of land, are absolute,[3] others may depend upon the end for which the act is done."
Now, if the slightest invasion of the right to enjoy land, if mere withholding of the right to sit in a chair that one owns but does not intend to use for profit,[4] are actionable per se, what should be, what must be the policy of the law as to the unlawful interference with the highest instance of the highest form of one of the few rights granted by the national Constitution itself? The right of freedom, of election, or enjoyment of untrammeled participation in national trade?
It does seem that when the national government itself grants a right and undertakes its protection against both States and people, takes its sole protection upon itself, and declares it of the highest importance, it should warrant at least as high a sanction of policy as the right to sit in a chair from which nothing but mere comfort is intended or expected. In re Debs,[5] illustrates how determined the Supreme Court has been to safeguard this right! But the analogies, if not the absolute decisions, seem to cover this question. Indeed, it has been long settled that the
- ↑ Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 370 (1886).
- ↑ 195 U. S. 204 (1904).
- ↑ Bradford vs. Pickles, A. C. 587 (1895).
- ↑ "The Mediana," [1900] A. C. 116 (1900).
- ↑ In re Debs, 158 U. S. 568 (1895).
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