Page:Earle, Liberty to Trade as Buttressed by National Law, 1909 62.jpg

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If this be the right method of approach, and, of course, it is, being pointed out by the Supreme Court, there should be no difficulty as to the Knight case.

In the Knight case, the purpose being to prove non-liability, only those facts were necessarily inquired into whose presence would create liability, if found.

As the meaning of the decision, therefore, absolutely depends upon these findings, let us seek it in them.

In the first place, it was thought necessary to find that there was a complete purchase, a complete change of property. The reason is obvious.

In the second, that every one was left free. Again the reason is obvious.

In the third, that it was a case of contract, and the provisions related solely to that purchase and not to subsequent arrangements as to trade. Again the reason is obvious.

Again, that the refineries had continued to operate and had actually increased their product, that the object of purchase "was manifestly private gain in the manufacture of the commodity;" "that there was nothing in the proofs to indicate any intention to put a restraint upon trade or commerce" and, finally, that what was done was either "sanctioned," or "permitted" "by the States of residence or creation." And the decision—a veritable mine of law—held, of course correctly, that, under these findings, the restraint was indirect and, therefore, lawful.

Let the converse of this be stated:

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