had this decision been rendered than it was promptly abused by the trusts; and, after awhile, the Securities case, identical in method, came before the court, and it then found "tendency" as a fact on its added knowledge of trust methods, but it really followed the law of the Knight case, departing only from its inference of fact, which the trusts bad proved no longer tenable, by their subsequent misconduct.
And this is established by the unanimous opinion in the Harriman case.[1] There Chief Justice Fuller says: "The objection was that the exercise of its powers, whether those of owner or of trustee, would tend to prevent competition, and thus to restrain commerce. Some of our number thought that as the Securities Company owned the stock the relief sought could not be granted, but the conclusion was that the possession of the power which, if exercised, would prevent competition, brought the case within the statute, no matter what the tenure of title was."
That is "tendency" controlled; not the question as to whether that unlawful thing resulted from one form of forbidden thing, rather than from another. But if this be not sufficient demonstration that the Knight case turned on the innocence of intent then believed in, Loewe vs. Lawlor[2] certainly must close the discussion, for the Chief Justice again expressly says, p. 297:
"We do not pause to comment on cases such as United States vs. Knight (156 U. S. 1), Hopkins vs. United States (171 U. S. 578), and Anderson vs. United States, in which the undisputed facts showed that the purpose of the agreement was not
- ↑ 197 U. S. 291 (1905).
- ↑ 208 U. S. 274, p. 297 (1907).
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