we shall not treat it as a resstraint, no matter what it is called. The strange part of the dissent is that there is much in it to prove that Mr. Justice White really had the true distinction in his mind all the while. He even cites Mr. Justice Maule in Rannie vs. Irvine.[1]
The passage in the Freight Association case[2] on the treatment of intent, should be noted, being of the utmost importance, as are the following illustrations of what may be a direct restraint from the Joint Traffic Association case:[3] "There can be no doubt that the general tendency of competition among competing railroads is toward lower rates for transportation, and the result of lower rates is generally a greater demand for the articles so transported, and this greater demand can only be gratified by a larger supply, the furnishing of which increases commerce. * * * The natural, direct and immediate effect of competition is, however, to lower rates, and to thereby increase the demand for commodities, the supplying of which increases commerce, and an agreement, whose first and direct effect is to prevent this play of competition restrains instead of promoting trade and commerce." And, of course, identity of reasoning must apply where one of the steps between the act and the result is removed, as where manufacture itself is stopped, and it was so unanimously determined in the Addyston case.[4] Since this, there has been little difficulty. The Montague case was of a class where recovery has always been allowed, for citizens' freedom as to national trade was limited. It in no way
- ↑ 7 M. & G. 969 (1844).
- ↑ 166 U. S., at pp. 341-2 (1897).
- ↑ 171 U. S. 576 (1898.
- ↑ 175 U. S. at p. 245 (1899).
79
