Page:Eight chapters of Maimonides on ethics.djvu/80

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THE ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES

If, on the other hand, a man is a squanderer, he must be directed to practise strict economy, and to repeat acts of niggardliness. It is not necessary, however, for him to perform acts of avarice as many times as the mean man should those of profusion. This subtle point, which is a canon and secret of the science of medicine, tells us that it is easier for a man of profuse habits to moderate them to generosity, than it is for a miser to become generous. Likewise, it is easier for one who is apathetic [and eschews sin] to be excited to moderate enjoyment, than it is for one, burning with passion, to curb his desires. Consequently, the licentious man must be made to practise restraint more than the apathetic man should be induced to indulge his passions; and, similarly, the coward requires exposure to danger more frequently than the reckless man should be forced to cowardice. The mean man needs to practise lavishness to a greater degree than should be required of the lavish to practise meanness. This is a fundamental principle of the science of curing moral ills, and is worthy of remembrance.

On this account, the saintly ones[1] were not accustomed to cause their dispositions to maintain an exact balance between the two extremes, but deviated somewhat, by way of [caution and] restraint, now to the side of exaggeration, and now to that of deficiency. Thus, for instance, abstinence would incline to some degree towards excessive denial of all pleasures; valor would approach somewhat towards temerity; generosity to lavishness; modesty to extreme humility,[2]


    returned to the middle course which is the moral one; and, when he has done so, let him continue in it all his days. He should act in a similar way with all his characteristics. If he is far from the middle course, at one extreme, let him force himself to go to the other, and accustom himself fully to it, until he returns to the proper course, which is the medial trait as regards each characteristic”.

  1. See infra, c. VI; and M.'s Commentary on Abot, V, 7. 11.
  2. M. departs from strict adherence to the Aristotelian doctrine of the mean, which Aristotle himself does, at times, and especially as regards the virtue of justice. M. states here that the deviation from the mean on the part of the saints was because of caution and restraint. Later, in H. Deot, I, 5, he expands this thought in drawing a distinction between the wise