watchful suspicion; and if events progress in the same direction as they have been progressing during the past ten years, that suspicion must so far become intensified that it will produce action of a decided character. Russia's attitude towards us is, if we are not wholly mistaken in reading the meaning of the policy she has pursued for so many years, one of covert hostility. The practical point to ascertain, then, is, what is the military strength which this covert hostility has at its disposal? For Englishmen the question which transcends all others in importance and interest is, how many men can Russia send across the Oxus? What troops can be conveyed by the Caspian to either Krasnovodsk or the Atrek? And what reserves can be pushed forward by the armies of the Caucasus and of Orenburg to reinforce the offensive army which should have taken up its position in the outskirts of Cabul?
The inquiry is not free from uncertainty and doubt. It is impossible to estimate exactly beforehand the degree of difficulty which the obstacles of nature — such as the badness of the roads, the want of water, and pasture for the horses and baggage animals, the delay in bridging rivers, the hindrances to be encountered in a mountainous region, and numerous other similar circumstances — would offer to the advance of a considerable army either towards the Hindoo Koosh or Herat. It is possible to minimise each and all of these; but it is also far easier to magnify them. Natural obstacles have a habit of vanishing before large armies and determined generals. In all direc-
