its total consequences, taking absolutely everything into account, are the best possible. It is by no means clear that we do always mean this. We may, perhaps, sometimes mean merely that the action is expedient for some particular purpose; and sometimes that it is expedient in the interests of the agent, though not so on the whole. But if we only mean this, our theory, of course, does not compel us to maintain that the expedient is always a duty, and duty always expedient. It only compels us to maintain this, if “expedient” be understood in the strictest and fullest sense, as meaning that, when absolutely all the consequences are taken into account, they will be found to be the best possible. And if this be clearly understood, then most people, I think, will be reluctant to admit that it can ever be really inexpedient to do our duty, or that what is really and truly expedient, in this strict sense, can ever be wrong.
But, no doubt, some people may still maintain that it is or may be sometimes our duty to do actions which will not have the best possible consequences, and sometimes
