motives actually does affect do not consist of judgments as to whether the action done from the motive is right or wrong; but are moral judgments of some different kind; and there is still more reason to think that it is only judgments of some different kind which ought to be influenced by it.
The fact is that judgments as to the rightness and wrongness of actions are by no means the only kind of moral judgments which we make; and it is, I think, solely because some of these other judgments are confused with judgments of right and wrong that the latter are ever held to depend upon the motive. There are three other kinds of judgments which are chiefly concerned in this case. In the first place it may be held that some motives are intrinsically good and others intrinsically bad; and though this is a view which is inconsistent with the theory of our first two chapters, it is not a view which we are at present concerned to dispute: for it is not at all inconsistent with the principle which we are at present considering—namely, that right and wrong always depend solely upon consequences. If we held this view, we might still hold that a
