Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 1.djvu/672

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664 PEDBEAIi EEPOKTBB. �of proceedinga in admiralty causes, and some other cases ■where the proceeding is strictly in rem, may be supposed to be exceptions to the rule. They are not properly exceptions. The law regards the seizure of the thing as constructive notice to the whole world, and ail persons concerned in interest are considered as affected by thîs constructive notice. But, if these cases do form an exception, the exception is confined to Cases of the class already noticed, where the proceeding is strictly and properly in rem, and in which the thing con- demned is first seized and taken into the custody of the court." �In Walden's Lessees v. Craig's Heirs, 14 Pet. 154, the same court says: "It is admitted that the service of process or notice is neoessary to enable a court to exercise jurisdiction in a case, and if jurisdiction be taken where there bas been no service of process or notice the proceeding is a nullity. It is not only voidable, but it is absolutely void." In Shelton V. Tiffin, 6 How. 186, the same court says : "Had the circuit court which rendered that judgment jurisdiction of the case ?

  • * * No process was served upon L. P. Perry, nor does

it appear chat he had notice of the suit until long after the proceedings were had. But there was an appearance by counsel for the defendants, and defence was made to the action. This being done by a regularly practicing attorney it affords prima fade evidence, at least, of an appearance in the suit by both the defendants. Any individual may waive process and appear voluntarily." �The court then discusses the evidence tending to show that the attorney was not authorized by L. P. Perry to appear, and proceeds : "But the appearance by counsel, who had no authority to waive process or to defend the suit for L. P. Perry, may be explained. An appearance by counsel under Buch circumstances, to the prejudice of a party, subjects the counsel to damages, but this would not sufSciently protect the rights of the defendant. He is not bound by the proceedings, and there is no other principle which can afford him adequate protection. The judgment, therefore, against L. P. Perry must ��� �