868 FEDERAL REPORTBB. �revoked during the pendency of the suit there brought ; and inasmuch as the state court, after hearing, bas decided that during the pendency of the suit the plaintiff is net entitled to derive any advantage from the agreement of compromise, or from his notice of revocation of the license, that determina- tion wouid seem to entitle the defendants to a stay of a pro- ceeding of the character now pending against them in this court ; for that proceeding arises out of acts whieh the pro- visional injunction issued by the state court permits the defendants to do during the pending of the state court suit. Se that, should a commitment of the defendants be the resuit of the pending proceeding in this court, the defendants will be punished by this court for doing acts in ail respects simi- lar to the acts which a competent court, in an action betvveen the same parties, bas declared the defendants to be entitled to do, until the question of the validity of the agreement of com- promise has been passed on, and that upon a motion. Still further, the pending contempt proceeding will be of no avail to the plaintiff unless it be followed so far as to compel the defendants to desist in future from manufacturiiig bungs of the description covered by the license. The very acts per- mitted by the provisional injunction of the state court are, therefore, in reality the acts sought to be stoppod by the pending proceeding in this court. It can hardly be that the plaintiff is entitled, as a matter of right, in this way, and by motion, to bring in review before this court the action of the state court, or, by means of a motion to attach the defendants, call upon this court to pass upon questions of which the state court has become possessed by a formai suit there daly iusti- tuted. �It has been strongly insisted on behalf of the plaintiff that his rights in this court rest upon the final decree of this court, and cannot be affeoted by any action of the state court in the suit referred to. But the fact that the final decree of this court was made by consent, and not upon a determination of the court, and that such consent is contained in the agree- ment of compromise, cannot be disregarded. In a certain modiiied sense the decree is part of the contract now before ��� �
