EALSTON V. CRITTENDEN. 261 �the payment of the interest" — interest being mentioned first — "and the redemption of the principal thereof." Now, that was an obliga- tion which the state assumed in the original act, that she would pay the interest and redeem the principal. Section 9 says : �" Each of said corapanies shall make provisions for the punctual redemp- tion of the said bonds so issued as aforesaid to them, respectively, and for the punctual payment of the interest which shall accrue thereon, in such nianner as to exonerate the treasury of this state from any advances of moiiey for that purpose." �The state obliged herself to pay the interest, and she also obliged the Hannibal & St. Joe Eailroad Company to pay the interest which should accrue thereon ; not only what the state had paid, but "in such manner as to exonerate the treasury of the state from any advances of money for that purpose." �Can we believe that when the act of 1865 came to be passed by the state it intended anything less than this ? Can we believe that it intended to modify that principle as to what should be paid, what should be secured, or how she should be indemnified ; that it intended to make it any less strong or secure than it was ; or that any less should be demanded or paid than was required by the act of 1851? On the contrary, the very language which I have read and under- taken to criticise attempts to make more. It says all indebtedness which is due, which is owing, and all liability. It has added other words distributively to enforce the principle that the state is to lose nothing; that she is to suffer nothing; that whenever you come in and want to get rid of this statutory mortgage, or, rather, have it turned over to you, (for you do not merely get rid of it — you keep it alive to have it turned over to you,) you are to do certainly as much as was required by the act of 1851, and if anything had occurred since that requiring you to do more, you are to do it. It says, "all liabilities." �I have no question, and neither have my brethren on the bench, that that is the true and sound construction of the act of 1865, and inasmuch as that has not been done, the power vested in the gov- ernor by the original act of 1851, to sell on default of interest, remains. �It is said, however, that since the state has accepted the principal, and the amount of interest that may be yet due by these trustees or the railroad company, or the obligation that may yet rest on them, is uncertain, and has not yet been ascertained, we must, by injunction, restrain the governor from selling. That is a misapplication of the ��� �
