36 FEDERAL REPORTER. �Tenn. Leg. Eep. 141. The worda of the request do not appaar in the report, but the court says : �"Yet it bas not been held that a general request for delay from time tO time, or an assurance that the debt ia good, will save the operation of the statute of two years. Such were the requests in this case; and when the statute is complete it is a devastavit in the executor or administrator to pay such barred debt for which he will be held liable." �These are all the cases on this particular subject of the definite- ness of the time, but there are others illustrating the rigidity with which the courts adhere to these statutes to protect dead men's es- tates. Although the common statute does not run against a dis- tributee, the administrator being an express trustee, yet, if the ad- ministrator die, this statute of two years attaches in favor of liis representatives; the administrator is himself bound by it, as to his own debt, and must pay himself within the two years by settling with the clerk and having his debt allowed ; and the state is itself barred by il, even for taxes, which is not so as to the other statutes of limitation. Gallnway v. Murray, supra; Brown v. Porter, 1 Humph. 373 ; Hamner v. Hamner, S Head, 398 ; Byrn v. Fleming, Id. 658 ; State V. Crutcher, 2 Swan, 514. The Massachusetts cases under a similar statute, referred to in Trott v. West, supra, are to the same effect. Dawes v. Shed, 15 Mass. 6; Waltham Bank v. Wright, 8 Allen, 121 ; Jenney v. Wilcox, 9 Allen, 246 ; Bradford v.Forbes, Id. 365 ; Wells V. Ghild, 12 Allen, 333. �Having gone over these cases with the utmost care, I am of the opinion that the paper offered in evidence here does not show that any definite time was agreed upon for the duration of the delay, and that it is impossible to say from it, by reference to any event, how long the delay should continue. He gives as his reason for asking delay the fact that he had not yet collected assets to pay the debts of the testator. If any implication can possibly be based on the language of this paper, it is that the collection of sufficient assets to pay all the debts of the testator is the event which is to fix the duration of the time of indulgence. This may never happen, and according to the position taken by the defendants bas not yet happened, now quite eleven years from the date of this paper. It was apparent to these defendants — on their theory of this case, that the executor had nothing to do with the real estate — then, as now, that this event would never happen. The fatal defect of this paper, in this regard, is too obvions to require further consideration. �It was suggested that the proof shows that there were then pending ��� �
