MOBA V. NUNEZ. ���6el ���Mora V. Poster there were both a decree of confirmation and a final suivej and location of the adverse grants. It was in all respects, including the character of the adverse grant by Pico, confirmed, like the present case. The grant to De Celis was also like that in Work- maii's Case, 1 Wall. 745, and Jones' Case, Id, 766. And the claim for the mission in that case was presented by the bishop for confirmation in the same petition as was the land patented to the bishop in this case. If one patent is conclusive record evidence in an action at law of the proper location of the land, so must another be ; and defend- ants' patent is as conclusive evidence, in such an action, that it is correctly located, so as to exelude these tracts of land, as plaintifif's patent that it is properly located so as to include them. Bach pat- ent is the last act in the series of proceedings for confirmation, and the final and conclusive record as to where the title is and asto what it 00 vers. It is the final evidence of the matter adjudged between the United States and the claimant. If it shows no right in the ■patentee as against the United States, it can show none against another patentee of the United States. If there is an error in the description, or location, it must be remedied, if it can be remedied at all, elsewbere. Besides, the plaintiff's survey and location were made and became final under the act of 1860. If it was erroneous, the confirmees of defendants' grant had an opportunity under that statute of correcting it. If they did not embrace that opportunity, the failure to do so was owing to their own laches, and the implica- tion to be derived from the decision of the United States supreme court in Rodrigues v. U. S. 1 Wall. 582, is that they are bound by the resuit. So, also, even had both patents covered the land, the origin of the claim confirmed to plaintiff's grantor was long prior to that confirmed to defendants. See Henshaw v. Bissell, 18 Wall. 268-9. But it is not necessary to consider what the rights of the parties would be had both patents embraced the lands. It isenough for this case that the final and conclusive record of defendants' title excludes the land, while that of plaintiff's includes it. In my judgment, the public interests and public policy demand that the principle of the conclusiveness of the patent in collateral proceedings established in the cases referred to, and followed to its logical conclusion in this case, should be rigidly adhered to. The security of titles and the public peaee require that confidence should be reposed in the action and records of the judicial tribunals of the country, and in the public records and officiai action of other public officiais acting within the v,10,no.6— 41 ��� �
