ONITED STATES V. MULLAN. 789 �sive upon the courts and departments from that time forward. Con- gress may not have the power, by a legislative construction which a statnte will not bear, to affect the rights of part:e3 already properly and legally vested under the statute, bat it may, certainly, give a leg- islative construction which shall apply to all future cases and all subsequent acts. Tbis it bas, in my judgment, done in the present instance, whatever the proper prior construction may have been. The language, it bas been seen, is, "when any tract embracing coal- heds or coal-fields, constituting portions bf the publie domain, and which, a& ' mines,' are excluded from the pre-emption act of 1841, and which, under past legislation, are not liable to ordinary private entry," it shall be lawful to dispose of them in a prescribed mode, entirely dificrent, and on much more onerous terms than are applicable to other public lands ; and these terms are modified, but still different from other public lands, in several and all subsequent acts of eongress. Here is a manifest intent to include coal lands in the definition of the terms "mines, minerai land," as used in the act of 1841, and "past legislation," otherwise the whole object and purpose of this part of the act wonld fail. �There are no coal lands as such mentioned in the act of 1841, or "which, • as mines,' are excluded from the pre-emption act," or which, under past legislation, are not liable to ordinary private entry, unless they are embraced in the term "mines" or "minerais," as used in the act of 1841 and subsequent acts. Upon any other construction of the act of 1864, and subsequent acts, providing for a disposition of the coal lands in the public domain, there would be, absolutely, no lande and no subject-matter upon which these provisions in question could operate, as the coal lands provided for are only such as were excluded as "mines" in the act of 1841, and "past legislation." AU coal lands not before excluded as "mines" would be governed by the ordinary Btatutory provisions as to a disposition of the public domain. On any other hypothcsis no change in the law would be effected. It appears to me, therefore, to be indisputable that, at least since the act of 18(J4, and subsequent acts, on the subject, coal lands have, by leg- islative definition of the term "mines," as used in the act of 1841, been excluded from sale or selection otherwise than as provided in those acts. In view of these acts, and this legislative definition also, the act of 1866 excepts coal lands improperly seleeted from confirma- tion, under the terms of that act, and espeoially under the words any "minerai Jands," in the first section. ��� �
