Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 3.djvu/704

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BLACKBUBN V. S. B. CO. 697 �England to do it until the pernicious effects of the practice caused the courts to fix upon the confirmation as the point at which its negotiationa for a larger priee would cease. The title of the purchaser never prevented the court from assum- ing control after confirmation, but public policy indueed it to say that after that event the sale should stand, exeept for fraud or misadventure of some kind. I am, tberefore, of opinion that too much importance bas been Bometimes at- tached to the process of confirmation; and certainly it will npt do to extend the consideration for the purchaser' s title in a case of the loss of the property, when the question is who shall bear it, to the matter of the control of the court over the sale for the purpose of procuring a larger price. It seems to me, in ail cases, the purchaser, whatever may be the char- acter and incidents of his title and ownership, must be under- stood to be under the control of the court until confirmation, and liable to have his purchase vacated if some one will give enough larger sum to induee the court to refuse the flrst offer. �Now, Personal property may sometimes be perishable, or subject to such fluctuations of value or other contingencies as would make an absolute sale desirable to alf concemed, or it may be an imperative necessity. If so, the court can pretermit its subsequent control and direct an absolute sale, as is clearly suggested may be done in Williamson v. Berry, supra. Mostly the chancery courts deal with real estate, and, comparatively, they are seldom caUed upon to sell Personal property, though their jurisdiction is now much oftener invoked for that purpose than formerly, and for this reason it may be that the cases on confirmation of sales and opening of biddings are almost entirely cases of sales of real estate, as stated at the bar; but I cannot infer from this that the practice is confined to real estate, and I think if so important a distinction existed the books would bave called attention to it. �Unquestionably the courts do, in sales of personal prop- erty, exercise more caution in vacating sales; nevertheless, they do require confirmation, and may be set aside solely for ^an advance of pri'ce. The case of Anson v. Twogood, 1 Jac. ����