620 FEDEEAL EEPOKÏEE. �the assent of the requisite proportion of the creditors ^vho have proved their debts, to whom he is liable as principal debtor. One Tliayer bas proved a debt for upwards of |30,- 000. This creditor bas not assented, and, if bis claim is to be considered in the computation of the requisite one-third in value, this point is well taken, The question is whether the bankrupt is liable aa principal debtor upon this claim. Thayer's proof of debt is upon a bond for the sum of $60,000, executed by the bankrupt, June 15, 1877, to one Hill, as receiver, ap- pointed by the court in an action against John A. Duff and others. Thayer proves as assignee of the bond. The con- dition of the bond is the payment of the sum of $30,000 to the receiver, or his assigns, June 15, 1882, with interest semi-annually, "according to the condition of a bond made by John A. Duff and Eufus G. Duff, jointly and severally, to Baid receiver, bearing even date herewith, to which bond this is collateral." I think enough appears on the face of this bond to show that this obligation was incurred by the bank- rupt not on his own aceount, but as surety for John A. Duff, and, therefore, that he cannot be regarded as having become indebted thereon as principal debtor. The construction of this phrase, "principal debtor," was carefully considered by this court in In re Loder, 4 N. B. E. 190. It was there held that an obligation as indorser, after the liability bas become fixed by non-payment and notice, is not an obligation as "principal debtor," if the indorsement was for the accom- modation of the maker of the note. I think the present case is within that decision. It is argued, however, that on this bond itself the bankrupt was the principal obliger, — indeed, the only obliger, — and not in the position of an indorser. who is on the face of the contract not the principal obligor. I think, however, that the distinction in the statute referred not to the form of the obligation so much as to the real relation of the bankrupt to the debt itself. Greater indulgence was intended to be extended to bankrupts in respect to obligations incurred on behalf of others than in respect to those incurred on their own aceount ; and it seems to me to be immaterial whether the bankrupt joins in the bond of the principal debtor as a ����
