Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 5.djvu/669

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TILLEY V. SAVANNAH, FLOEIDA & WESTERN E. 00. 657 �tion can only be satisfactorily solved by a board which is in perpetuai session, and whose time is exclusively given to the consideration of the subject. �It is obvions that to require the duty of prescribing rates for the railroads of the state to be performed by the general assembly, consisting of a senate with 44 members, and a house of representatives with 175, and which meets in regu- lar session only once in two years, and then only for a period of 40 days, would resuit in the most ill-advised and haphaz- ard schedules, and be productive of the greatest inconvenience and injustice, in some cases to the railroad companies, and in others to the people of the state. It is impracticable for such a body to prescribe just and reasonàble rates. To insist that this duty must be performed by the general assembly itself, is to defeat the purpose of that clause of the constitu- tion under consideration. �The view taken by complainant would preclude the legis- lature from the use of the necessary means and agencies to accomplish what it is required by the constitution to do. The congress of the United States gives to congress the power to levy and collect taxes j but this does not require congress itself to assess the property of the tax payer, and collect the tax. The constitution of Georgia clothes the general assem- bly with the power of taxation over the whole state, and requires taxes to be assessed upon ail property ad valorem. But this does not require the legislature to investigate through its committees or otherwise, and declare by an act the value of every piece of property in the state subject to taxation. �A familiar instance of the use of agencies by the legislature for the exercise of the power vested in it by the constitution, is found in the creation of municipal corporations, and of the powers of legislation which are commonly bestowed upon them. The bestowal of such powers is not to be considered as trenching upon the maxim that legislative power is not to be delegated, sinee that maxim is to be understood in tha light of the immemorial practice of this country and England, which bas always recognized the propriety of vesting in municipal corporations certain powers of local regulation in �v.5,no.8— 42 ����