Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 5.djvu/752

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740 FEDERAL REPORTER. �Defendants deny that the indebtedness is about $32,000; aver that ail of said indebtedness is owing to persons or firms who (or some members of whom) were stockholders on April 14, 1874, and their stock represented at said meeting ; that ail of the existing debt bas been incurred since the passage of the resolution of April 14, 1874, and with knowledge of it; that by virtue of said resolution and of the premises the stock of said Company became and was fuUy paid up, and that they are released from ail liability on their subscriptions. �The reply denies that ail of the indebtedness of the Com- pany is owing to persons -who are stockholders, or firms, some of whose members are stockholders ; that the property of the Company was on April 14, 1874, worth $100,000 ; that ail of the indebtedness existing at that date bas been satisfied ; that there was any legal stockholders' or directors' meeting on April 14, 1874, and the legality of the action then taken; alleges that said meeting was not held according to the char- ter and by-laws, was held without due notice, and that a quorum was not present, and that Damarin & Co. bave since paid their stock in fuU. �This is an action purely at law. It possesses none of the elements of an equity proceeding. And while in the state courts, by virtue of our Code, law and equity may be joined in the same proceeding, it is not so in the federal courts, That question bas been seyeral times before the supreme court. In the case of Thompson v. Railroad Companies, 6 Wall. 137, the supreme court say : "The constitution of the United States and the acts of congress reoognize and establish the distinc- tion between law and equity. The remedies in the courts of the United States are, at common law or in equity, not according to the practice of state courts, but according to the principles of common law and equity as distinguished and defined in that country from which we derive our knowl- edge of these principles. And although the forms of pro- ceedings and practice in the state courts shall bave been adopted in the circuit courts of the United States, yet the adoption of the state practice must not be understood as con- founding the principles of law and equity, nor as authorizing ����