Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 5.djvu/848

From Wikisource
Jump to navigation Jump to search
This page needs to be proofread.

836 FEDERAL REPORTER. �troversy in another court of concurrent jurisdiction that pre- vents it in the other. Eeceivership, or other possession of the court, is not in the way, unless interference with it would be led to. Neither is the pendency of other litigation, unless it is identical as to subject and parties. �An examination of some of the most prominent cases upon these subjects shows these distinctions : �In Slocum v. Mayherry, 2 Wheat. 1, it was held that prop- erty seized by custom officers could not be replevied by pro- cess from a state court. �In Harris v. Dennie, S Pet. 292, that goods in like situation could not be attached upon such process. �In Hogan v. Lucan, 10 Pet. 400, that property in custody of a state sheriff could not be taken by a United States mar- shal. �In Wisiveli v. Sampson, 14 How. 52, that property in the hands of a reeeiver of a state court could not be levied upon by the United States marshal in behalf of a judgment creditor. �In Taylor v. Garyl, 20 How. 583, that a vessel in custody under proceedings of foreign attachment in a state court could not be taken by the marshal under process iu admi- ralty from a United States district court. �Still, in Buck v. Colbath, 3 Wall. 334, it was held that the principles of these cases did not prevent maintaining a suit in a state court, in favor of the owner of property, against a United States marshal for attaching it as the property of another on process from a United States circuit court. Mr. Justice Miller, in delivering the opinioîi of the court, said it was "a principle which is essential to the dignity and just authority of every court, and to the comity which should reg- ulate the relations between ail courts of concurrent jurisdic- tion." . "This principle, however, bas its limitations ; or, rather, its just definition is to be attended to. It is only when prop- erty is in possession of the court, either actually or construct- ively, that the court is bound or professes to protect that possession from the process of other courts." �The property out of which this litigation arises is not now in the possession of the defendants, either as receivers of ����