PULLMAN V. B. & 0. B. 00. 73 �US upon the hearing are ail ex parte. There lias been no cross-examination of witnesses; and, take it altogether, the violation of the complainants' patent does not seem to us so clear and without doubt as to authorize us at once to issue the injunction prayed for. �The interests involved on each side are very great ; and were we to grant the motion upon evidence of the character now farnished by the complainants, contradicted by evidence of as low a grade by the defendant, we might do as much irre- parable injury as we are asked to prevent. �This is a matter addvessed to the sound discretion of tho court. It is not a matter of course, upon the presentation of a patent, which prima facie establishes the right of the patentee to the thing patented, accompanled by an allegation that the defendant is violating it, that a preliminary injunc- tion will issue ; but it must appearlikewise that, if the writ of injunction does not now issue, the complainants will be irre- parably injured, and that no subsequent decree of the court can sufficiently ascertain and make good their damages. �For ten years the defendant company has, under contract with the complainants, been running sleeping cars of the complainants over their road. It haij now built certain cars of its own, as it is alleged, after the patent of the complain- ants, which it purposes to run over the same line of road. What irreparable injury does this cause ? The profits accru-, ing to the complainants for the use of the cars of complain- ants hitherto run by defendant under the contract between them are known, and there can be no difficulty in ascertain- ing the loss to complainants by the use of the cars defendant proposes to run. But to grant this motion upon these ex parte afEdavits would be to unnecessarily deprive the defend- ants of the use of a large capital invested in the building of these cars before the question of infringement is adjudicated. If the defendant company were insolvent and not answerable in damages, it would afford strong reason for the present interference of the court. But this is not pretended. �It is alleged, and urged strongly upon the court in argu- ment, that the complainants bave a System of contracts with ����
