and the consciousness, on the opposite side, of contending against the force of all these solemn considerations.
It is farther to be considered, that in the gradation between the smallest and largest States, there are several, which, though most likely in general to arrange themselves among the former, are too little removed in extent and population from the latter, to second an opposition to their just and legitimate pretensions. Hence, it is by no means certain, that a majority of votes, even in the Senate, would be unfriendly to proper augmentations in the number of Representatives.
It will not be looking too far to add, that the Senators from all the new States may be gained over to the just views of the House of Representatives, by an expedient too obvious to be overlooked. As these States will, for a great length of time, advance in population with peculiar rapidity, they will be interested in frequent reapportionments of the Representatives to the number of inhabitants. The large States, therefore, who will prevail in the House of Representatives, will have nothing to do, but to make reapportionments and augmentations mutually conditions of each other; and the Senators from all the most growing States will be bound to contend for the latter, by the interest which their States will feel in the former.
These considerations seem to afford ample security on this subject; and ought alone to satisfy all the doubts and fears which have been indulged with regard to it. Admitting, however, that they should all be insufficient to subdue the unjust policy of the smaller States, or their predominant influence in the councils of the Senate, a constitutional and infallible resource still remains with the larger States, by which they will be able at all times to accomplish their just purposes. The House of Representatives can not only refuse, but they alone can propose the supplies requisite for the support