the additional pretext for clamor against the Judiciary, which so considerable an augmentation of its authority would have afforded.
Would it have been desirable to have composed the Court for the trial of impeachments, of persons wholly distinct from the other departments of the Government? There are weighty arguments, as well against, as in favor of such a plan. To some minds it will not appear a trivial objection, that it could tend to increase the complexity of the political machine, and to add a new spring to the Government, the utility of which would at best be questionable. But an objection which will not be thought by any unworthy of attention, is this: a Court formed upon such a plan, would either be attended with a heavy expense, or might in practice be subject to a variety of casualties and inconveniences. It must either consist of permanent officers, stationary at the seat of Government, and of course entitled to fixed and regular stipends, or of certain officers of the State Governments, to be called upon whenever an impeachment was actually depending. It will not be easy to imagine any third mode materially different, which could rationally be proposed. As the Court, for reasons already given, ought to be numerous, the first scheme will be reprobated by every man who can compare the extent of the public wants with the means of supplying them; the second will be espoused with caution by those who will seriously consider the difficulty of collecting men dispersed over the whole Union; the injury to the innocent, from the procrastinated determination of the charges which might be brought against them; the advantage to the guilty, from the opportunities which delay would afford to intrigue and corruption; and in some cases the detriment to the State, from the prolonged inaction of men whose firm and faithful execution of their duty might have exposed them to the persecution of an intemperate