his being, at all times, liable to impeachment, trial, dismission from office, incapacity to serve in any other, and to forfeiture of life and estate by subsequent prosecution in the common course of law. But these precautions, great as they are, are not the only ones which the plan of the Convention has provided in favor of the public security. In the only instances in which the abuse of the Executive authority was materially to be feared, the Chief Magistrate of the United States would, by that plan, be subjected to the control of a branch of the Legislative body. What more could be desired by an enlightened and reasonable people?
[From M'Lean's Edition, New York, M.DCC.LXXXVIII.]
[THE FŒDERALIST.] No. LXXVIII.
[To the People of the State of New York:]
WE proceed now to an examination of the Judiciary department of the proposed Government.
In unfolding the defects of the existing Confederation the utility and necessity of a Fœderal Judicature have been clearly pointed out. It is the less necessary to recapitulate the considerations there urged, as the propriety of the institution in the abstract is not disputed; the only questions which have been raised being relative to the manner of constituting it, and to its extent. To these points, therefore, our observations shall be confined.
The manner of constituting it seems to embrace these several objects:—1st. The mode of appointing the Judges;—2d. The tenure by which they are to hold their places;—3d. The partition of the Judiciary au-
