was ejected from the train. He sued for damages, and the Court of Appeals held that he was entitled to recover.
For the same reason the ticket-holder has no right, upon a single ticket, to travel a part of the way on one train, and the rest of the way on another train. This is dividing the performance into two parts; a thing that may not be done in case of a formal contract. If the passenger leaves the train before he reaches his point of destination he has no right, unless he has first obtained permission from the company, to ride on to the point of destination upon the same ticket.
There is no reason, however, for requiring the passenger to take the train at the station named as the beginning of the journey. So long as the passenger enters the train between the points named on the ticket, and rides no further than the point of destination of the ticket, he has a right to present his contract for performance. Thus, a passenger having a ticket for New York from Buffalo may enter the train at Rochester, or may leave it at Albany.
The bearer of a ticket, however, cannot entirely change its terms, even if he puts no additional burden upon the company. A ticket from Portland to Boston will not, as a matter of right, entitle the bearer to a passage from Boston to Portland.
A ticket may be issued by one who is not in the position of maker; thus, one railroad may issue tickets over the line of another road. It has generally been said that the railroad issuing the tickets acts as agent of the road over whose line the ticket is issued; but this theory is difficult to sustain in all cases, for a company often issues tickets where there is no agency in fact. Thus, in Hudson v. Ry. Co., the Kansas-Pacific Company, not being authorized to do so, sold tickets over the line of the Denver and Rio Grande Company. The latter company refused to allow a passage over its road on the tickets. The court held the Kansas-Pacific Company justified in issuing such tickets, and held it liable in an action upon the ticket. This sort of ticket is much like a bill of exchange; the drawer being liable if the drawee refuses to accept the instrument. It seems that this is the true nature of the
- R.R. Co. v. Bartram, 11 Oh. St. 457; Cheney v. R.R. Co., 11 Met. 121; Vankirk v. R.R. Co., 76 Pa. St. 66.
- Auerbach v. R.R. Co., 89 N. Y. 281.
- Keeley v. R.R. Co., 67 Me. 163.
- Brooke v. Ry. Co., 15 Mich. 332; Ry. Co. v. Dean, 43 Ark. 529.
- 3 McCrary 249; and see Cloud v. Ry. Co., 14 Mo. App. 136, 143, 145.