SECURITY INFORMATION
naval forces to the vicinity of Basra with a mission of assisting Middle East governments in preventing the spread of communist power to their countries. This would be accomplished by the physical presence of U.S. military Power, demonstrations of strength and as a last resort, when authorized by proper authority, combat operations. CINCNELM has been requested to make appropriate recommendations with regard to this course of action but his reply has not yet been received. our present state of preparedness is such that the 82nd Airborne Division, the 2nd Marine Division or an infantry division in Europe could be moved on short notice provided the necessary shipping were made available. The movement of any one of these divisions would take approximately 60 days. The logistic support required to maintain the deployment of these forces could be accomplished only at the expense of critical supplies new destined for Korea. Similarly, any force deployments to the Middle East would necessitate a substantial upward revision of U.S. force ceilings or a reduction of our commitments elsewhere.
b. Economic : The U.S. Government would provide such economic ass stance as required to sustain and strengthen whatever non-communist Iranian Government: remained after the communist coup. specific plans for this eventuality cannot be prepared in advance, but it is likely that requirements for such aid would follow the general pattern though on a reduced scale, of the economic assistance being given the ROK Government. The early appointment of an overall coordinator for economic aid would on the basis of Korean experience, greatly increase the effectiveness of any specific economic measures which might be undertaken in such a contingency.
c. Diplomatic: (1) The United States Government will not recognize a communist government of Iran and will publicly support anti-communist Iranian elements in Iran or abroad. Such support might involve the recognition of an Iranian Government in exile. Since the Shah might be a useful rallying point for such a Government, arrangements to facilitate his escape from Tehran in an emergency are under consideration. In addition, there will probably always be some prominent Iranian public figures outside Iran (such as the Iranian Ambassador to the United States) who could participate in such a movement. For political and security reasons, no advance planning in this regard can be attempted with any Iranian leaders, including he Shah.
(2 Any anti-communist Iranian Government will under such circumstances undoubtedly appeal to the United Nations for
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Declassfied
Authority:NND959285
By :WDP NARA Date:2/29/00
