(6) Internal net 15/16 was heavily used and difficult to get information across.
(7) Internal communications procedures, i.e. specific call ups in accordance with standard procedures, were known by operators but not always used.
e. Combat Systems Doctrine
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B.EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE AIR ENGAGEMENT
1.Ancillary Air Data
a. At 0330Z 3 July 1988 the disposition of the non-participant ships, both U.S. and Allied, was as follows:
(1) USS JOHN HANCOCK was at SITRAH anchorage in Manama, Bahrain.
(2) USS HALSEY was in the Northern Persian Gulf, RPS.
(3) USS O'BRIEN was off Kuwait waiting to begin the outbound transit of Sea Isle City and M/V Patriot.
(4) USS FAHRION was inport Ras al Khaimah for a routine port visit.
(5) USS CORONADO was pier side, Mina Sulman at Manama, Bahrain with CJTFME embarked.
(6) HMS MANCHESTER was 150 NM from the incident, outside the SOH. HMS BEAVER and the Italian warship ESPERO were in the Southern SOH, approximately 75 NM from the incident.
(7) CJTFME requested all three Allied ships to provide any information relative to TN 4131 and whether they had heard the warnings on IAD. HMS BEAVER responded by delivering its recordings and transcripts of the USS VINCENNES IAD warnings to the Senior Investigating Officer. HMS MANCHESTER indicated that it did not hear the warnings over IAD. Information received from the Italian Naval Headquarters indicated that the ESPERO did not hear the IAD warnings.
b. At 0610Z the three principle U.S. Navy warships involved in Iran Air Flight 655 incident were:
(1) USS VINCENNES (CG 49), Located at 26-26 N 056-02E.
(2) USS ELMER MONTGOMERY (FF 1082), located approximately 5 NM from USS VINCENNES.
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