Page:Iran Air Flight 655 investigation.djvu/37

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  (IO Exhibit 131 CJTFME 232220Z MAY 88 para 8).

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(6) (S) COMIDEASTFOR OPORD 4000-85 amplifies the ROE with regards to required warnings by stating: "Do not stop after just one step: If there is no response to radio requests/warnings, do something to attract attention. Subsequent warning actions to take include:

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(a) (S) Locking on with fire-control (radar)

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(b) (S) Maneuvering to unmask weapons

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(c) (S) Shooting flares

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(d) (S) Flashing signal/search lights

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(e) (S) Training guns

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(f) (S) Fire warning shots (star shell, AAC timed to offset)

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(g) (S) If you are confident that the warning has been received, and the contact continues to close, para 9 of reference (a) (Tab A to Appendix 8 to Annex C to COMIDEASTFOR OPORD 4000-85) applies."

(IO Exhibit 137).

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(7) (S) Tab A to Appendix B to Annex C to COMIDEASTFOR OPORD 4000-85 amplifying the ROE provides in paragraph 9: "If a potentially hostile contact persists in closing after you warn him away and if, in your judgement, the threat of attack is imminent, it is an inherent right and responsibility to act in self-defense. We do not want, nor intend, to absorb a first attack." (IO Exhibit 136).

(8) (U) The following is quoted verbatim from paragraph 3, page c-8-A-l of Ch 2 dated Sept 1986 Tab A to Appendix 8 to Annex C to COMIDEASTFOR OPORD 4000-85 (U): Rules of Engagement, Supplemental Measures – "The most serious threat is that of terrorist/suicide attack. If such an attack occurs, it is most likely to happen from a craft (e.g. military cargo or surveillance aircraft, non-military boats or aircraft) which appears to be operating in a "normal" manner up to the point of attack. There is less danger of overt attack by Iranian or Iraqi

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