Page:Iran Air Flight 655 investigation.djvu/80

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(o) (S) Iranian F-14's have an air-to-surface capability with Maverick missiles, iron bombs, and modified Eagle unguided rockets.

(p) (U) TN 4131 could have been a suicide attack.

10.(U) Having other forces under his tactical control (SIDES, MONTGOMERY) intensified the CO USS VINCENNES's feeling of responsibility to defend his task group from hostile action.

11.(U) The information available to CO, USS VINCENNES, upon which he based his decisions, conflicted in some cases with the data available in USS VINCENNES' command and decision (C&D) system. Specifically:

(a) (U) The C&D system contained no Mode II IFF information on TN 4131 yet operators in CIC had used Mode II as a means of declaring TN 4131 an Iranian F-14.

(b) (U) The C&D system showed TN 4131 continuously ascending, while the CO received reports of "descending altitude" immediately prior to enabling the firing key.

12.(U) Psychological factors: As the investigation developed, and it was discovered that there were disparities between the C&D tape data and what various members of CIC believed they saw, the senior investigating officer requested the professional advice of USN Medical Corps personnel who have studied combat stress. The following opinions draw heavily on their conclusions. (See Encl. 18)

— Stress, task fixation, and unconscious distortion of data may have played a major role in this incident.

— TIC and IDS became convinced track 4131 was an Iranian F-14 after receiving the IDS report of a momentary Mode II.

— After this report of the Mode II, TIC appears. to have distorted data flow in an unconscious attempt to make available evidence fit a preconceived scenario. ("Scenario fulfillment")

— TIC's perception that there was an inexperienced, weak leader in the AAWC position led to the emergence of TIC in a leadership role. TIC's reports were accepted by all and could have influenced the final decision to launch missiles.

13.(U) Captain Rogers' action in delayisg engagement of TN 4131 with missiles until it was well within 15 NM demonstrated an appreciation for the seriousness of the consequences of his actions and was balanced with his responsibility to defend his ship.

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