�This Page Declassified lAW EO12958 diminished the control of the commanding general of the GHQ Air Force over his per- sonnel. Although failing far short of satis- fying those who had demanded a separate air force, the establishment of a separate strrking force under the new organization at least gave the Air Corps an opportunity to demonstrate the doctrine of offensive air power which General Mitchell and his followers had long advocated as a basic concept of modern military strategy.tO Congress took cognizance of the new or- gani2ation of the air arm in an act of August 12, 1935 which provided for the lo- cation of additional permanent Air Corps stations and depots in all the strategic areas of the United States, including Alaska and the overseas possessions. These stations were to be suitably located to form a nu- cleus for concentrations of the GHQ Air Force in war and to permit peacetime train- ing in each of the strategic areas.4? On 16 June 1936 an act of Congress gave authority to the President to appoint from among permanent lieutenant colonels or colonels who were flying officers, a com- manding general of the GHQ Air Force with the rank of major general and such wing commanders with the rank of brigadxer generaI as might be necessary. It was also provided that up to 1,350 Air Corps Reserve officers might be called up, with their con. sent, for a five-year period of training. The act provided that pitors and observers should be designated as flying officers and authorized temporary promotion m the grades from major to colonel, inclusive, for such regular flying officers of the Air Corps as wJght be necessary to meet its admim's- trotire, tacticel, technical, and training needs. A 5 per cent increase was authorized to meet additionat needs of the War De- partment for Air Corps officers.?e Another way in which the Air Corps prof- ired from the air mail investigations was in the recommendation by the Baker Board for an additional 520 planes. This recom- mendation was 1ollowed by Congress on 24 June 1936, when it authorized an increase of the airplane strength of the Air Corps to 2,320 planes, 520 over the 1,800 author- izod by the Air Corps Act of 1926. The act of ?une 24, 1936 also authorized purchase of equipment and accessories necessary to complement the increase in plane strength, with provisions for a 25 per cent reserve, in order to enable the Secretary of War to com- plete the organization of, and to maintain, the GHQ Air Force and our overseas alefen. sos, 4? It was during the period of the early and middle thirties that the A?r Corps launched its long-range bomber program. The B-17 grew out of proposals distributed among manufacturers by the Air Corps in 1933 for a design competition to be held the follow- ing year. Boeing developed a four-engine bomber of revolutxonary design, the XB-17 prototype of the B-17 (F!y?ng Fortress) winch successfully complefed its first test flight in July 1935. The A?r Corps recom? mended the purchase of 65 B-l?'s in place of !85 other aircraft which had bee n pre- viously authorized for the fl.,cat year 1936, After ?n unfortunate accident destroyed the original model, the War Department re- duced the number to be purchased to 13. By August 1937 these 13 Flying Fortresses had been delivered to the Air Corps. The 1act that the dates of the activation o? the bomber program and those of the activation and legislative implementafior of the GHQ Air Force coincided closely suggests that the leaders of the Air Corps may well have accepted a compromise on the question of the organization of the air arm in the hope that this might clear the way for the acceptance of the long-cher- ished heavy bomber program.* After 1935 the Air Corps was characterized not so much by its concern to change the basic or- ganization of natmnel defense as by a de- termination to find in the GHQ Air Force the basis for an ambitious program of bomber development. Thereafter most Army airmen were, above all else, advocates of the big bomberJ? If air power was to be a major factor in warfare, and not merely an auxiliary to the ground service, the air arm had to proceed on the basis that its number one job was bombardment.
- ?See Ora?e?l ?'n?l Cato, ?he AAF In World War IL ?, pp,
51-?1, for an aeoouni of the dcvclopment from 1935 Of the doctrine of str?teEJ½ air power, and the Air Corps progrl?r?l for deYelopin? and bu{ldin? long-r?gc bo-xbardment plane? to implement this doctrine THIS PAGE Declassified lAW EO12958
