Page:Legislative History of the AAF and USAF.djvu/32

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�This Page Declassified lAW EO12958 Azr Force disorder which had erosted in the manu- facture (and procurement) of mutations m the U.S., a mtuation m which about a dozen purchamng mm?ions from yamcue countries had been trying to buy arms m our market. They had been competing w?th each other and wth us, and th?s competition had pro- duced delay ? Although there was now a mbre orderly system of allocating a?rcraft productton between the Urnted States and fnendly powers, the lend-lease program nevertheless made ?t progresmvely more difficult for the Army A?r Forces to procure the aircraft necessary to implement its ex- pansion program. In June 1941 Robert A. Lovett, Assistant Secretary of War for Air, stated that the 25-group program (whtch now constituted the first step toward a modified 54-group program) was at least four months behind as a result of the deferrnent of matoriel to the needs of the British2 ? The Air Corps procurement situation was still further complicated by the entrance of Rusma the war m June of 1941 and the subsequent extenmon of lend-lease aid to that country. The policy which came to be fo]lowed m the' silocarton of tarcraft production under the lend-lease program called ?or the alloca- tion of planes where they could be used most effect?vely--this, of course, was in combat. Hence, the A?r Corps had to defer the full reahzatmn of ?ts 54-group prograin to the extent that a?reraft it had ordered were made available under lend-lease for use by Great Britain in the mr oftenrove against Germany, and by the Rueroans ?n repelling German mvamon. Although a g?- gantic effort was made to increase produc- tion to meet all these needs, the AAF found itself on the very eve of war working under an allocation system which made impostable the early achievement of its 54-group pro- gram. This state of affairs contributed very largely to the lack of complete preparedness of the AAF on M-Day. u INVESTIGATIVI= ACTION TAKEN BY CONGRES? Although the Army air arm had not at- tarried the goals of the expanmon program when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, the great increase m a?rcraft production since the beginning of 1939 had been suffi- cient to give substantml md to Great Bnt- mn and to bmld up the Air Corps to a strength which allowed it to absorb its m?t?al losses and to begin a l?m?ted offen- sive m less than a year. A malor portion of the credit for making thts achmvement poe- ruble must be attributed to the actran taken by Congress m the enactment of the nec?- sa? legislation. Congress also contributed to the development af American mr power through the exermse of ?ts investigative powers. Congress established several committees to investigate the caring on of the war effort, the most powerful, comprehemive, ?d eftochre of which was ?e so-called T?an Com?ttee.* Thi? committee gave an ?mpre?ve example of the cons?uctive contmbution the legrelative branch can make to the successful management of a war program. ?e Truman Co?ttee grew out of ?he anxiety felt by Congress regarding the p?n- ning and adm?mstratmn of defense mob?h- zat?on m the year preceding Pearl Harbor when billions were berg spent in a hastRy orgamzed defense program. As the got under way, Congress was flooded with complaints of extravagance, waste, profi? coring, ?avoritmm m awarding contr?ts, and ? a?ost complete fafiure to utihze the Iamhtms of small bus?ness. M?y mem- bers of Congress feared ?hat the great raze and maldmtmbutmn of the tremendous renee expenditures would change our economy for the worse. They also feared the pohtmal consequences of a pubhc opin- mn aroused by the ?shandhng of drYtees or equipp?g them with delec?ive weapons or machines2 ? Senator Har? S Truman took the initia- tive m estabhshmg thin committee as a re- suit of a trip late m 1940 m whmh he in- spooled war ?ndustrms in h?s own state and along the way on ?s return to Washington. He arnved there with an ?pre?on of waste and insufficient pl?ning on the pa? of the War and Navy DepartmenB and other ?enmes responmble for the mobi?za- t?on effort, Feeling that both public opinion THIS PAGE Declassified lAW EO12958