Page:Legislative History of the AAF and USAF.djvu/52

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�This Page Declassified lAW EO12958 Forces must be employed together and co- ordinated under one chrectmg staff and under one over-all command. "?0 The views of Harnell and Lovett were generally upheld by all War Department and Army personnel who appeared before the Woodrum Committee, hxcluding Secre- tary of War Stimson, Under Secretary of War Patterson, General McNarney, Deputy Chief of Staff, and General Sometroll, Com- manding General, Army Service Forces. Secretary Stnnson approved the princxple of consolidation but felt that its realiza- tion must be delayed until a/for the war. General McNarney preferred enabling t?on on the part of Congress which would provide for a consolidation not less than months after the close of hostfiities. The Navy Department and Navy per- sonnel took a different pmnt of wow. Under Secretary of l?avy James V Forfestal ap- proved a complete exaramation of the nation's war machine but refused to say that the N. avy approved consolidation into one department. Although he was later to become the first Secretary of Defense, in 1944 1?. Forrestal was skeptical of the rapidly rising agitation for a single urnfled military department--he admittedly ap- proached th?s matter from a strong pro- Navy viewpoint. With the exception of Admiral Yarnell, none of the Navy Depart- merit witnesses who testified before the committee came out ?n favor oœ consoli- dation. ? At the conclusion of ?ts hea?ings the Woodrum Committee submitted a report which stated, among other things, that clid not behove the time opportune for uni- fication Ieg/slation even though ?t might eventually be considered a wise course action to consohdate the services. The com- mittee felt that Congress ought to have the benefit of the )udgment and experience of many of the commanders m the field before effeet/ng any final plan of reorganization. The Joint Chiefs of Staff soon furrushed the medium for securing this advice and coun. sol when, on 9 May 1944, it appointed the Special Committee for the 11eorgamzation of Natzonal Defense. This comn?ttee of out- standing Army and Navy officers made a thorough and careful study of defense re- orgamzat?on extending over a period of 10 months. It toured the major theaters of war (European, Mediterranean, Paon?c, and Southwest Pacific), consulting õ6 key personnel of the Army and Navy, 24 such ind?wduals testified before the co?nmittee in Washington where ?t held about 100 separate meetings. The co?i?tee made ? re?or?s on Ap?l 1945. The majority rcpor? po?cd out tha? the progre? made m cooperation tween the se?ices m World War II w? feeted largely ?ro?gh the w?de war powers granted ?o the President. S?ce these wo?d lapse s? months after ?he end oi the war, the repor? urged prompt statutory action to retain the ?provements obta?ed by executive order and a?ms?rat?ve pr? ced?re. The repor? pre?ed a pMn conso?dat?on of the ?med ser?ces ?n?o a s?gle "Department oi ?ed Forces" der ? cidtitan ?ecreta? directly responsible to the President. There ? to be an ?der 3ccre?a? act?g ? ?he chiel ?sis?ant to the ?ecretary, ?everaI ?s?tant ?ccrctar?e?, ?d a mfiitary commader of the amed forc? who would also be chief of st? to the President. The?e were ? be three co- ordma? combat branches, Amy, Na?, and ?r. A?y and ?r would each be headed by a comman?ng generM, and by an a?ir?. These three, plus the secre- tary ?d the colander of the ?med ?orces, wo?d co?t[tute the U.S. Chief ?taff to advise with the President on ?- ta? and budgeta? affairs. AccorEng to the JOS co?ittee, the statutory creation of a coorSate a? force would merely ?ve legal recog?tion to a situation, evolved from common experience, which already e?sted m the iota of a ally autonomous ?. ?e fuH mfiit? force of ?e count? could not be applied ?thout the f? development of air power. It w? not, however, reco?end?d that ?l[ aviation tn the services be con?ntrated under the air forces. It was stipulated that nav? aviation should remaM ? essential par? of the s? iorces, and ?hat the ?ound forces should retain inte?al confro! over those air act[wties necessary ior halson, at- THIS PAGE Declassified lAW EO12958