Page:Montesquieu - The spirit of laws.djvu/128

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76
THE SPIRIT

Book V.
Chap. 8.
Every sort of asylum in opposition to the execusion of the laws destroys aristocracy, and is soon succeeded by tyranny.

They ought always to mortify the pride of domineering. There should be either a temporary or perpetual magistrate to keep the nobles in awe, as the Ephori at Sparta, and the state Inquisitors at Venice, magistrates that are subject to no formalities. This sort of government stands in need of the strongest springs: thus a mouth of stone[1] is open to every informer at Venice, a mouth to which one would be apt to give the appellation of that of tyranny.

These tyrannical magistrates in an aristocracy bear some analogy to the censorship of democracies, which of its own nature is equally independent. In fact, the censors ought to be subject to no inquiry in relation to their conduct during their office; they should meet with a thorough confidence, and never be discouraged. In this respect the practice of the Romans deserved admiration; magistrates of all denominations were accountable for their administration[2], except the censors[3].

There are two very pernicious things in an aristocracy; either excess of poverty, or excess of wealth, in the nobility. To prevent their poverty, it is necessary, above all things, to oblige them to pay their debts in time. To moderate the excess

  1. The informers throw their scrolls into it.
  2. See Livy, I. 49. A censor could not be troubled even by a censor, each made his remark without taking the opinion of his collegue; and when it otherwise happened, the censorship was in a manner abolished.
  3. At Athens the Logistae, who made all the magistrates accountable for their conduct, gave no account themselves.
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