practical public life. The conclusion which I have long come to is one which seems rather obvious when one has got at it, but it is so seldom acted on, that apparently most people find it difficult to practise. It seems to me, in the first place, that a conscientious person whose turn of mind and outward circumstances combine to make practical political life his line of greatest usefulness, may, and often ought to, be willing to put his opinion in abeyance on a political question which he deems to be, in the circumstances of the time and place, of secondary importance; which may be the case with any question that does not, in one's own judgment, involve any fundamental principle of morality. But, in consenting to waive his opinion, it seems to me an indispensable condition that he should not disguise it. He should say to his constituents and to the world exactly what he really thinks about the matter. Insincere professions are the one cardinal sin in a representative government. If an Australian politician wishes to be in the Assembly for the sake of questions which he thinks much more important, for the time being, than that of Protection, I should hold him justified in saying to a constituency 'I think Protection altogether a mistake, but since it is a sine quâ non with you, and the opposite is not a sine quâ non with me, if you elect me, I will not oppose it.' If he conscientiously thought that the strong feeling of the public in its favour gave them a right, or made it expedient, to have it particularly tried, I should not think him wrong in promising to support it; though it is not a thing I should lightly, or willingly, do. He might even, for adequate public reasons, consent to join a Protectionist Ministry, but only on condition that Protection should be an open question—that he should be at liberty to speak his mind publicly on the subject. The question of expediency in these matters, each must decide for himself. The expediencies vary with all sorts of formal considerations. For instance, if he has considerable popular influence, and is, in all other respects than this, the favourite candidate, it will often be his most virtuous course to insist on entire freedom of action, and make the electors feel that they cannot have a representative of his quality without acquiescing in voting against some of their opinions. The only absolute rule I could
