Page:NTSB - Railroad Accident Report - Derailment on May 25, 1989.djvu/66
to return to a steady presentation; the background color does not change until the operating condition changes. According to Calnev, subsequent to the rupture, Calnev modified its automated control system to include a high flow set point whereby if excessive flow is observed out of the Colton pump station (indicative of a potential leak or rupture), the system will automatically shut down the Colton pump, and indicate the alarm condition.
Emergency Response Manual.—On the day of the pipeline rupture, Calnev did not have any procedures in its abnormal operation response plans (a section of the company’s emergency response manual) that would advise the dispatchers of the actions to take upon receiving both a low discharge pressure and a low suction pressure alarm. Calnev’s manager of operations stated, "We felt that it was adequately covered in the explanation section for low suction pressure" which advises that the line pressure be checked in the event of a low suction pressure alarm. He stated further that following the pipeline rupture, Calnev revised its manual to include an explanation of what to do in the event a low discharge pressure alarm is received.
Calnev’s emergency response manual was last revised in January 1989. The manual contains a list, by milepost, of telephone numbers for fire and police departments, and procedures for notifying Calnev personnel and other agencies in the event of a spill or leak. The manual also contains maps of the pipeline and directions to each mainline block valve, and procedures for responding to a natural disaster and external incidents.
The procedures for a suspected leak require the pipeline to be shut down, pressures to be stabilized, remotely operated valves to be closed, and pressures in specific sections of the pipeline system to be monitored. If a leak is confirmed, the procedures outline specific actions to be taken to locate the leak and to respond to the leak.
The procedures for a natural disaster and external incident refer to the potential adverse effects of train derailments. The procedures indicate that substantial portions of the pipeline system are built on the railroad right-of-way and that train derailments pose a serious threat to the pipeline primarily by equipment being used to clear the wreckage and replace the roadbed. The areas where the pipeline system is located near railroad tracks are listed by milepost; the area of the train derailment of May 12, 1989, is included in this section. In the event of a train derailment, the procedures indicate that Calnev personnel are to be immediately dispatched to the scene and assess the situation to determine if the pipeline could have been damaged. Railroad personnel are to be contacted and advised of the location of the pipeline. In the event of possible damage, the pipeline is to be shut down, and upstream and downstream valves are to be closed. The procedures also indicate that once the pipeline has been secured, the location of the pipeline through the derailment area should be accurately marked, heavy equipment should not be allowed to operate over the pipeline if it is considered hazardous to the pipeline, and Calnev personnel should be present on scene until all work is completed.