Page:Nature and Character of our Federal Government.djvu/109

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OUR FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.
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are to determine whether or not they have given the federal courts authority to bind them in any given case. This principle has frequently been asserted by the States, and always successfully.[1]

But these mere technical rules, upon which we have hitherto considered the subject, are altogether unworthy of its importance, and far beneath its dignity. Sovereign nations do not ask their judges what are their rights, nor do they limit their powers by judicial precedents. Still less do they entrust these important subjects to judicial tribunals not their own, and, least of all, to the tribunals of that power against which their own power is asserted. It would have been a gross inconsistency in the States of our Union to do this, since they have shown, in every part of their compact with one another, the most jealous care of their separate sovereignty and independence. It is true they have agreed to be bound by the decisions of federal tribunals in certain specified cases, and it is not to be doubted that, so long as they desire the continuance of their present union, they will feel themselves bound, in every case which comes plainly within their agreement. There is no necessity to call in the aid of the supreme court to ascertain to what subjects, and how far, that agreement extends. So far as it is plain, it will be strictly observed, as national faith and honor require; there is no other guarantee. So far as it is not plain, or so far as it may be the will and pleasure of any State to deny or to resist it, the utter impotency of courts of justice to settle the difficulty will be manifested beyond all doubt. They will be admonished of their responsibility to the power which created them. The States created them. They are but an emanation of the sovereign power of the States, and can neither limit nor control that power.

Ordinarily, the judiciary are the proper interpreters of the powers of government, but they interpret in subordination to the power which created them. In governments established by an aggregate people, [ *91 ]*such as are those of the States, a proper corrective is always found in the people themselves. If the judicial interpretation confer too much or too little power on the government, a ready remedy is found in an

  1. Hunter and Martin, Cohen vs. State of Virginia, and other cases.