Page:O. F. Owen's Organon of Aristotle Vol. 1 (1853).djvu/299

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is a deception produced through syllogism, and this happens in two ways, in those things which are primarily present, or not present; for it happens either when one simply apprehends the being present, or not being present, or when he obtains this opinion through syllogism: of simple opinion, then, the deception is simple, but of that which is through syllogism, it is manifold. For let A not be present with any B individually, if then A is concluded to be present with B, assuming C as the middle, a person will be deceived through syllogism. Hence it is possible that both propositions may be false, but it is also possible that only one may be so, for if neither A is present with any C, nor C with any B, but each proposition is taken contrary, both will be false. But it may be that C so subsists with reference to A and B, as neither to be under A nor universally (present) with B, for it is impossible that B should be in a certain whole, since it was said that A is not primarily present with it; but A need not be universally present with all beings, so that both propositions are false. Nevertheless, we may assume one proposition as true, not either of them casually, but the proposition A C, for the proposition C B will be always false, because B is in none; but A C may be (true), for instance, if A is present individually, both with C and B, for when the same thing is primarily predicated of many things, neither will be predicated of neither; it makes no difference however if it (A) be not individually present with it (C).

The deception then of being present, is by these and in this way only, (for there was not a syllogism of being present in another figure,) but the deception of not being present with, is in the first and middle figure. Let us first then declare in how many ways it occurs in the first, and under what propositional circumstances. It may then happen when both propositions are false, e. g. if A is present individually with C and B, for if A should be assumed present with no C, but C with every B, the propositions will be false. But (deception) is possible, when one proposition is false, and either of them casually; for it is possible that A C may be true, but C B false; A C true, because A is not present with all beings, but C B false,