Page:On the Fourfold Root, and On the Will in Nature.djvu/406

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THE WILL IN NATURE.

Metaphysic "Ethics", than Spinoza, with whom the word sounds almost like irony, and whose "Ethics" might be said to bear the name like lucus a non lucendo; since it is only by means of sophistry that he has been able to tack his morality on to a system, from which it would never logically proceed. In general, moreover, he disavows it downright with revolting assurance.[1] On the whole, I can confidently assert, that there has never yet been a philosophical system so entirely cut out of one piece, so completely without any joins or patches, as mine. As I have said in my preface, it is the unfolding of a single thought, by which the ancient άπλούς ὸ μύθος τἢς άληθείας ἔφυ[2] is again confirmed. Then we must still take into consideration here, that freedom and responsibility—those pillars on which all morality rests—can certainly be asserted in words without the assumption of the aseity[3] of the will; but that it is absolutely impossible to think them without it. Whoever wishes to dispute this, must first invalidate the axiom, stated long ago by the Schoolmen: operari sequitur esse (i. e. the acts of each being follow from the nature of that being),[4] or we must demonstrate the fallacy of the inference to be drawn from it: unde esse, inde operari.[5] Responsibility has for its condition freedom; but freedom has for its condition primariness. For I will according to what I am; therefore I must be according to what I will. Aseity of the will is therefore the first condition of any Ethics based on serious thought, and Spinoza is right when he says: Ea res libera dicetur, quae ex sola suae naturae necessitate existit, et a se sola ad agendum determinatur.[6] Dependence, as to existence and nature, united with freedom as to action, is a contradiction. Were Prometheus to call the creatures of his making to account for their actions, they would be

  1. For instance, "Eth." iv. prop. 37, Schol. 2.
  2. The language of truth is simple. [Tr.'s add.]
    "Whoever has to speak the truth expresses himself simply," from Euripides's Phoenician Women, V, 469. (Wikisource contributor note)
  3. Self-existence; self-dependence.
    It will be possible to call free that which exists from the mere necessity of its nature and is induced to act merely through itself. (Wikisource contributor note)
  4. Pomponatius, "On the Immortality of the Soul," p. 76 (Wikisource contributor note)
  5. "As the essence is, so is its action." (Wikisource contributor note)
  6. "Eth." i. def. 7. [Tr.]