Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part II.djvu/80

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011


TOP SECRET – Sensitive

II. B. 2.
THE ATTEMPT TO ORGANIZE "UNITED ACTION"

TABLE OF CONTENTS AND OUTLINE
Page
1. The Berlin Conference of 1954 B-17
a. Viet Minh Strategy and French Attitudes B-17
b. Early U.S. Opposition to Negotiations B-18
2. The Ely Mission (March 20 – 24) B-19
a. Dien Bien Phu Begins B-19
b. Operation Vulture (Vautour) B-19
3. "United Action" as an Alternative to Either Negotiations or to Unilateral U.S. Intervention B-20
a. Formulation of U.S. Policy B-20
b. Initial Allied Reaction to "United Action" B-22
c. French Call for U.S. Intervention at Dien Bien Phu (April 4 – 5) B-22
d. U.S. Decision Not to Intervene Unilaterally B-23
e. British Oppose "United Action" B-24
f. French Oppose "United Action" B-26
g. Aborted Working Group on Collective Defense in Southeast Asia (April 20) B-27
h. Continued French Prodding for U.S. Intervention (April 21 – 25) B-27
4. Final U.S. Position Before Geneva B-28
a. Exchanges with the French B-28
b. Exchanges with the U.K. B-29
c. The Washington Viewpoint B-30
5. Reappraisal of Domino Theory After Dien Bien Phu B-30
B-16
TOP SECRET – Sensitive