Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET – Sensitive
Vietnam to the free world the U.S. might deploy "self-sustaining forces to South Vietnam either unilaterally or as part of a Manila Pact force" or the U.S. could withdraw all U.S. support from South Vietnam and concentrate on "saving the rest of Southeast Asia."
No specific course of action was recommended but the JCS predicted the loss of Cambodia and Laos would follow a communist take-over of South Vietnam; they felt a greatly expended aid program would be necessary to retain a friendly government in Thailand. In any event, the chance that U.S. armed forces would be required to support American policy in Southeast Asia would be greatly increased if South Vietnam fell. The Chiefs concluded by saying "a firm decision at the national level as to the implementation of US policy in Southeast Asia is mandatory, recommended...against a 'static' defense for this area and...recommended adoption of a concept of offensive actions against the military power of the agressor."96
- 5. January 1955: U.S. Backing for Diem is Reaffirmed
General Collins' recommendations to the National Security Council on January 20, 1955 underscored the crucial position South Vietnam held within the context of American policy toward Southeast Asia. Like Dulles and the Joint Chiefs before him, Collins said:
In view of the importance of Vietnam to all of Southeast Asia, I am convinced that the United States should expend the funds, material and efforts required to strengthen the country and help it retain its independence. I cannot guarantee that Vietnam will remain free even with our aid. But I know that without our aid Vietnam will surely be lost to Communism. If the chances of success are difficult to calculate, the results of a withdrawal of American aid are only too certain not only in Vietnam but throughout Southeast Asia. Such a withdrawal would hasten the pace of Communist advances in the Far East as a whole and could result in the loss of Southeast Asia to Communism. In my opinion the chance of success is not only worth the gamble; we cannot afford to let free Vietnam go by default.97
Collins was more sanguine about Diem than he had been a month before. Diem had shown some progress: General Minh was named Minister of Defense and seemed to be doing an adequate job; Diem had launched an anti-corruption drive (and in closing the Grande Monde Casino, Diem threw down the gauntlet before the Binh Xuyen) and had made some advances in land reform. Collins recommended continued U.S. support for him:
On balance I believe that Diem's integrity, strong nationalism, tenacity and spiritual qualities render him the best available Premier to lead Vietnam...against communism.... Considering all factors, although the situation
