Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part IV. A. 5.djvu/17

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011


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government of Ngo Dinh Diem; and (2) that only after it became clear, in late 1960, that the U.S. would commit massive resources to succor Diem in his internal war, was the DRV impelled to unleash the South Vietnamese Viet Minh veterans evacuated to North Vietnam after Geneva. French analysts have long been advancing such interpretations; American protagonists for them often quote, for example, Philippe Devillers, who wrote in 1962 that:

"...In 1959, responsible elements of the Communist Resistance in Indo-China came to the conclusion that they had to act, whether Hanoi wanted them to or no. They could no longer continue to stand by while their supporters were arrested, thrown into prison and tortured, without attempting to do anything about it as an organization, without giving some lead to the people in the struggle in which it was to be involved. Hanoi preferred diplomatic notes, but it was to find that its hand had been forced."[1]

Devillers related how in March 1960 the "Nambo Veterans of the Resistance Association" issued a declaration appealing for "struggle" to "liberate themselves from submission to America, eliminate all U.S. bases in South Vietnam, expel American military advisors...." and to end "the colonial regime and the fascist dictatorship of the Ngo family."[2] Shortly thereafter, according to Devillers, a People's Liberation Army appeared in Cochinchina and:

"From this time forward it carried on incessant guerrilla operations against Diem's forces.
"It was thus by its home policy that the government of the South finally destroyed the confidence of the population, which it had won during the early years, and practically drove them into revolt and desperation. The non-Communist (and even the anti-Communist) opposition had long been aware of the turn events were taking. But at the beginning of 1960 very many elements, both civilian and military, in the Nationalist camp came to a clear realization that things were moving from bad to worse, and that if nothing were done to put an end to the absolute power of Diem, then Communism would end up by gaining power with the aid, or at least with the consent, of the population. If they did not want to allow the Communists to make capital out of the revolt, then they would have to oppose Diem actively...."[3]

Based on a similar analysis, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., held that:

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  1. Philippe Devillers, "The Struggle for the Unification of Vietnam," China Quarterly, No. 9, January–March 1962, 15–16.
  2. "Declaration of Former Resistance Fighters," excerpts in Kahin and Levis, op. cit., Appendix 5, 384–387.
  3. Devillers, loc. cit.