Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part IV. A. 5.djvu/200

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011


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b. Industry In industry, as compared with agriculture) foreign aid was more relevant, and visibly more effective. The DRV claimed in 19 63 that new capacity had raised the total value of factory and handicrart industrial output two and two-thirds times above the 1956 level; an average annual increase of some 20%. Socialization was pronounced: by 1963 state-owned enterpris es accounted for 60% of production, and partially state-owned about 6%. The North Vietnamese themselves possessed at the outset little capacity to carry out a balanced program of industrial development; in fact, handicapped as the DRV was by annual fluctuations in their agriculturally based economy and shortages of native technicians, its capability to absorb foreign aid was distinctly limited. Initially, to restore existing industrial plant) to improve comm unications, and to import consumer goods. Thereafter aid was extended in the form of credits for specified projects. The first DRV long range development plan) a three year program in 1958, proved too ambitious; targets were revised down annually, and at the end of the plan agricultural growth had averaged a little over 4'%, compared with 21% for industry . A Five Year Plan for 1960-1965 was designed for more "rational development" of heavy industry, but precisely how this was to be achieved, and the pace of improvement, apparently remained subjects of contention up until the exigencies of the war overtook the plan. U.S. intelligence is not informed as to hm-, precisely foreign aid was related to either DRV economic plans, but in terms of government budget revenues, the DRV reported that foreign aid and loans comprised 39.5% of its 1955 income, but dropped to only 15.7% of its 1960 income. By contrast, and as a measure of r e turn on both foreign aid and its own investment) profits from state enterpri ses contributed only 6·5 %to 1955 income , compared -lith 58.0% in 1960. Tota l aid for 1955 to 1963 was as follows:

ECONOMIC AID TO DRV 1955-1963 (In Millions of U.S . Dollars) 53/ .Donor (1) Grants Credits Total ~ Total Commu nist China 225·0 232.0 457.0 47.8 US SR 105·0 263.9 363.9 (2) 38.6 Rum ania 4.8 37·5 Poland 7·5 14·5 97·0 (3) 10.1 Czechoslovakia 9·0 7·5 East Germany 15·0 0 15·0 .1 .6 Hun gary 2.0 10.0 12.0 1.2 . Bulgaria 4.0 2·5 6.5 0·7 Total 372·3 584.l(3) 956.4 100.0

(1) Albania and North Korea also aided, insignificantly. (2) Does not include 1962 a g reeme nt for agricultural development assistance, value unknown.

(3) Includes $16 . 2 million extended in 1955 as a consort ium.

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