Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part IV. A. 5.djvu/294

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011


TOP SECRET – Sensitive

"Political and Security Problems of the Diem Government. President Ngo Dinh Diem's policy of strict control in the political and economic fields has caused a certain amount of internal dissatisfaction. Should the President's exercise of personal authority develop too far there may be danger that the resultant frustration of government officials might preclude the united support for his regime which the situation requires. Otherwise, the President's stern police measures and his emphasis on internal security have led to some criticism of the government. This emphasis on internal security stems from the recent emergence of the country, the continuation of communist-inspired violence and subversion, and such phenomena as the assassination of local officials in rural areas of southern Viet-Nam."

Half a year later, on January 7, 1959, a similar OCB Progress Report asserted:

"Internal Security. It has become increasingly clear that the communists, no longer expectant that Free Viet-Nam will fall to their control through peaceful methods, are executing a carefully planned campaign of violence aimed at undermining the stability of the Diem Government. Their concentration of activities in rural areas where communications and terrain make it difficult for the government to cope with them recalls the tactics used against the French during the Indochina War. Assassinations, particularly of officials in rural areas, continue at an alarming rate of about fifteen to thirty-five a month. Attacks on rubber plantations and reported communist plans to break up the land development, land reform and agricultural credit programs indicate deliberate efforts to interfere with Viet-Nam's economic programs."

The first National Intelligence Estimate to assess the new situation--and the first NIE or SNIE on South Vietnam since 1956--was issued in May, 1959 (NIE 63-59 , "Prospects for North and South Vietnam," 26 May 1959):

"The prospect of reunification of Communist North Vietnam (DRV) and western-oriented South Vietnam (GVN) remains remote. In the DRV the full range of Communist techniques is used to control the population, socialize the economy, impose austerity and direct investment to economic rehabilitation and development. The DRV maintains large armed forces. In South Vietnam, despite the authoritarian nature of the regime, there is far more freedom. Local resources and US aid are devoted to developing the armed forces, maintaining internal security, and supporting a relatively high standard of living, with lesser emphasis on economic development …

"In South Vietnam political stability depends heavily upon President Di em and his continued control of the instruments of
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TOP SECRET – Sensitive