Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part IV. A. 5.djvu/353

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011


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Diem replied civil guard not trained so needs bring back 20,000 reservists. He asked that I urge Dept to give favorable consideration force level request and I reiterated matter under careful study in Washington … "(Saigon 1216 to SecState, December 24, 1960) pp. 1-2)

When the Ambassador told Diem of approval to give him eleven H-34 helicopters as soon as possible) "he made no comment." He rejected notions that the Assembly might investigate executive departments (dismissing Durbrow's comment that we have the same system in America) and then commented on the Department's earlier recommendations with respect to the agroville program:

" … Although I had not mentioned corvee labor this time, Diem stated this only way collect equivalent of taxes from peasants and that this system is in Vietnamese tradition) but peasants in Cochin-China under French had not been asked to contribute labor. Therefore they now resent corvee labor and of course would not think of paying any monetary taxes. He pointed out peasants in central Viet-Nam willingly contribute free labor instead of taxes. I remarked one reason for discontent in south is arbitrary action of officials and the failure to explain needs to peasants before forcing them to work. Diem insisted peasants had been told of needs but they just lazy." (Ibid.) p. 3)

In view of Diem's expressed attitudes in this area) and the actual practice of his regime in implementing the agroville program) there was scarcely a basis for surprise when U.S. -urged provisions for paying peasants for their labor on the strategic hamlets went generally unfulfilled. In any event) Durbrow's report left little doubt that persuasion in pursuit of liberalizing reforms that Durbrow and State but not Diem) or) it would appear) MAAG or the DOD -- believed essential to counter the Viet Cong, had reached an impasse:

"On few occasions he let me talk, I urged he adopt reforms soonest since it essential to win further support of the people if Viet Cong menace is to be overcome) but he gave me no indication of reforms he may adopt. Before leaving I again expressed hope that he would accept our suggestion that he announce all liberalizing programs at one time in order to make best impact. Diem replied he would think about this but made no commitment.

"Comments. We have heard that Nhu, Thuan and others have been running into resistance when urging Diem to adopt worthwhile reforms. I also received impression he very reluctant to adopt reforms and is still basically thinking in terms of force to save the day, hence his insistence several times that

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