Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET – Sensitive
a. General McGarr Replaces General Williams
A study prepared at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College,[1] dated 10 June 1960, noted that:
"From a loose conglomeration of combat battalions and various supporting units under French command in 1954, and under the aegis of, and with the impetus furnished by the U.S. MAAG, the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces have evolved into a balanced defense force. This force consists of 3 corps, with 7 infantry divisions (tailored to meet the existing situation in Vietnam, rather than 'mirroring' U.S. or other divisions) and supporting arms and services, together with small but appropriate naval and air forces … These total forces have the mission of (1) maintaining internal security (eventually to become the primary mission of the civil guard and other civil security forces when these organizations reach a satisfactory state of organization, training and equipment, at which time the armed forces will become the 'back-up' force), and (2) providing limited initial resistance to attack from Communist North Vietnam … The President [Diem] continues to organize military units outside the aegis, and contrary to the advice, of the U.S . MAAG. These non-U. S.-supported units are of questionable value and tend to drain the best people away from U.S.-supported units. Also, they may result in a requirement for U.S. support, not previously programmed."
The same study noted as a major deficiency the unwieldy high command of the RVNAF:
"An example of complicated and duplicating channels of command is where a division commander receives orders from both the corps commander (who should be his undisputed boss) and the region commander in whose region his division is stationed. Another example is where the President, by means of his SCR-399 Radio Net (NCS in a radio van in the garden of the presidential office) sends operational orders to a regiment direct, bypassing the Department of National Defense, the General Staff, the field commander the corps, and the division. Still another example is where a chief of an arm gives orders to a unit of that arm, the unit being at the time assigned to a corps."
The study quoted above was produced at the behest of Major General Lionel C. McGarr, who was at the time the commandant at Leavenworth,
- ↑ "Study on Amry Aspects of the Military Assistance Program in Vietnam (U)," 10 June 1960.
