Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET – Sensitive
problem has become much more serious than the Civil Guard can manage, thereby requiring a disproportionately large RVNAF commitment, which has further resulted in a serious weakening of the RVNAF capability for defense against internal/external [sic] or overt attack in force. Rotation within RVNAF and Civil Guard cannot be accomplished regularly. Many units have been on operations for a year or more without relief, because RVNAF strength is insufficient to permit an adequate rotation policy and to conduct adequate border and coastal surveillance. Many troops are battle weary, in a state of low morale, and in need of recuperation and training. Notwithstanding the above deficiencies, GVN plans have recently been developed for the RVNAF Command Control and Logistic structure which upon implementation, possibly in the near future, should correct major deficiencies if adequate military strength is provided.
"The complete divorce of command control from logistics support in the field has resulted in a lethargic and cumbersome requi sitioning and supply system….
"The current military intelligence capability of the RVNAF is inadequate to support the critical intelligence requirements of all echelons of the armed forces …
The economic health of the' country, though not robust, has been improving rapidly. In the future, if current economic trends continue and the economy is not further disrupted by adverse security developments the economy will be able, insofar a s physical wealth is concern~d, to provide for the consumption needs of a growing population and at the same time to finance a steadily increasing proportion of local military costs and could under favorable conditions meet essentially all these costs …
Assumptions:
(1) That the greatest immediate threat to the continued existence of the Republic of Viet-Nam is posed by the steady expansion of guerrilla warfare by the Vietnamese Communists, with the Mekong Delta as a political and military base.
(2) That North Vi et -Nam has the capability of supporting guerrilla operations in SVN by infiltrating regular forces and cadre s to strengthen locally recruited eleme nts. (Guerrilla forces have increased from 3,500 to an ARVN estimate of 9,800 during 1960.)
(3) That at the present time the Diem Government offers the best hope for defeating the Viet Cong threat.
