Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part IV. A. 5.djvu/63

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011


TOP SECRET – Sensitive

a massive army, and modernizing it with Communist bloc aid.79 The ICC, discredited in its attempts to cope with observance of Article 14(d) of the "Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities..." regarding refugees, was further devalued as a stabilizing influence when forced to admit that it was impotent in inspecting compliance with Articles 16, 17, 18, and 19:80

"Article 16...the introduction into Viet-Nam of any troop reinforcements and additional military personnel is prohibited...

"Article 17...the introduction into Viet-Nam of any reinforcement in the form of all types of arms, munitions, and other war material, such as combat aircraft, naval craft, pieces of ordnance, jet engines and armoured vehicles, is prohibited...

"Article 18...the establishment of new military bases is prohibited throughout Viet-Nam territory.

"Article 19...no military base under the control of a foreign State may be established in the regrouping zone of either party; the two parties shall ensure that the zones assigned to them do not adhere to any military alliance and are not used for the resumption of hostilities or to further an aggressive policy."

In June, 1958, the ICC issued the following statement concerning its inability to enforce the provisions of Articles 16 and 17:81

"The persistence of the Parties in not accepting the Commission's interpretation of the provisions of the Agreements and their failure to implement the recommendations made to them by the Commission have rendered it difficult for the Commission to supervise the implementation of the Articles concerned. The Commission will, as hitherto, continue to discharge its duties under the Geneva Agreements, but would like to emphasize that the lack of cooperation from the Parties seriously affects the effectiveness of its supervision and control. The Commission can, therefore, discharge its responsibilities only to the extent permitted by the Parties, and not as decided by the Commission in accordance with the Geneva Agreements. The Commission hopes that in the future a larger measure of cooperation will be forthcoming from the Parties and the difficulties which have persisted so far will cease to hinder its activities."

The test of the Geneva Agreement also allowed for the rotation of personnel, and the replacement of "destroyed, damaged, worn out or used up" material, arms, and munitions, provided that advance notice

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